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P.O. Box 2816
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JASON ZANE GARNER,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________)

NOS. 43493 & 43494
CANYON COUNTY NOS.
CR 2014-11002, CR 2014-11016
APPELLANT’S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jason Zane Garner was on probation for two drug offenses and stalking. The
district court found that Mr. Garner violated three terms of his probation after an
evidentiary hearing. The district court then revoked his probation and executed his
aggregate sentence of ten years, with six years fixed. Mr. Garner timely appealed from
district court’s amended judgment and commitment.
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Garner argued that the district court erred by revoking
his probation. First, he contended that the district court lacked substantial and
competent evidence to find two of Mr. Garner’s alleged probation violations were
“willful,” as required by I.C.R. 33(f). He asserted that the case must be remanded for a
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“willfulness” determination. He also asserted that the case must be remanded because
it was not clear from the record that the district court would have revoked probation but
for its erroneous findings. Second, Mr. Garner argued that the district court abused its
discretion by revoking probation, assuming in arguendo the sufficiency of the evidence
for the violations.
This Reply Brief addresses the State’s argument that the requirement in I.C.R.
33(f) of a “willful” probation violation is in conflict with the statutes governing probation
violations and therefore of no effect.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Garner’s Appellant’s Brief. (Revised App. Br., pp.1–3.) They are incorporated
herein by reference.
ISSUE
Did the district court err by revoking Mr. Garner’s probation and executing his underlying
aggregate sentence of ten years, with six years fixed?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Revoking Mr. Garner’s Probation And Executing His
Underlying Aggregate Sentence Of Ten Years, With Six Years Fixed
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues that the statutes governing probation
violations control the district court’s decision to revoke probation and do not require a
finding of willfulness prior to revocation. (Respt. Br., pp.4–12.) Contrary to the State’s
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interpretation, the statutes and I.C.R. 33(f)1 are not in conflict. The statutes and I.C.R.
33(f) can be interpreted in harmony with each other. Interpreted as such, the statutes
and I.C.R. 33(f) prohibit the district court from revoking probation unless it finds the
violation was willful.
The three relevant statutes are I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, and 20-222.2 Idaho
Code § 19-2602 states:
If it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the terms and conditions
upon which the defendant was placed on probation by the court or any of
them have been violated or for any other cause satisfactory to the court,
the court may, at any time within the longest period for which the
defendant might have been originally sentenced by judgment of the court,
issue a bench warrant for the rearrest of the defendant.
I.C. § 19-2602. This statute authorizes the district court to issue a bench warrant to
arrest the defendant for any violation of the terms and conditions of probation. Next,
I.C. § 19-2603 states:
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and
conditions of probation, it may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce
any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment
was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation. The time
such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence
shall not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence. The defendant
shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a bench
warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the
defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served
following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho
Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the
withheld judgment or suspended sentence.

I.C.R. 33(f) was previously codified at I.C.R. 33(e). Compare I.C.R. 33(e) (West 2014),
with I.C.R. 33(f) (West 2015).
2 The State asserts that Mr. Garner failed to “even mention[ ]” these statutes. (Respt.
Br., p.8.) However, Mr. Garner cited these statutes on page three of his Revised
Appellant’s Brief. (Revised App. Br., p.3.)
1
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I.C. § 19-2603. Relevant here, this statute provides that the district court “may” revoke
probation “[w]hen the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and
conditions of probation.” Finally, I.C. § 20-222 states:
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court may
issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or
suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested.
Thereupon the court, after summary hearing may revoke the probation
and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be
executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought before it and may
continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction. In making a
determination to continue or revoke probation and suspension of
sentence, the court shall consider the defendant's risks and needs and
options for treatment in the community.
I.C. § 20-222(2). Similar to I.C. §§ 19-2602 and 19-2603, I.C. § 20-222 authorizes the
district court to issue a warrant for a violation of “any” probation condition. It further
provides that the district court “may” revoke probation “after summary hearing.”
Primarily relying on I.C. § 20-222, the State asserts that the district court may
revoke a defendant’s probation for “violating any of the conditions of probation.”
I.C. § 20-222 (emphasis added). (Respt. Br., p.6.) This assertion is contrary to the plain
language of the statute. Idaho Code § 20-222 allows the district court to “issue a
warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation.” I.C. § 20-222(2) (emphasis
added). Under this statute, the district court has broad authority to issue a warrant
without a determination that the alleged violation was willful. Any alleged violation will
suffice. Idaho Code § 19-2602 is consistent with this wide latitude to issue a warrant. It
too allows the district court to issue a bench warrant if the district court is satisfied that
the defendant has violated “any” term or condition of probation. I.C. § 19-2602. Thus,
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while these statutes allow the district court to issue a warrant for any violation, they do
not allow the district court to revoke probation for any violation.
Further, the directives in Idaho Code §§ 19-2603 and 20-222 on probation
revocation are mostly silent with respect to the procedure or findings required prior to
revocation. Idaho Code § 19-2603 gives the district court discretion to revoke probation
if it “finds” the defendant violated his probation. Similarly, I.C. § 20-222 gives the district
court discretion to revoke probation “after summary hearing.” Read together, these
statutes recognize that a finding must be made prior to revocation, and that revocation
is discretionary. See State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381 (Ct. App. 1994) (“Consistent
with the principles of due process, a court may revoke probation only upon evidence
that the probationer has in fact violated the terms or conditions of probation.”). But,
again, neither statute gives any guidance for the district court’s finding determination.
I.C.R. 33(f) fills in this gap. It provides:
The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the
defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such
action is proposed. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such
hearing. The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission
by the defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the
defendant willfully violated a condition of probation.
I.C.R. 33(f) (emphasis added). The last sentence of this rule explicitly requires the
defendant to admit, or the district court to find, a willful violation before the district court
revokes probation.3 In other words, the district court cannot revoke probation if

I.C.R. 33(f) was amended in 2012 to add this last sentence. Compare I.C.R. 33(e)
(West 2011), with I.C.R. 33(e) (West 2012). With regard to the “willful” addition, the
Criminal Rules Advisory Committee Meeting minutes explain:
3

The Committee considered whether this rule should be amended to
reiterate that a violation of probation must be willful. This is already the law
5

probation was not “willfully violated.” Thus, I.C.R. 33(f) explains what is required before
the district court exercises its discretion under the statutes to revoke probation: it must
find the violation willful.
“When a statute and rule ‘can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no
conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way
that results in a conflict.’” State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974 (2008) (quoting State v.
Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 543 (1985) (Bakes, J., dissenting)). “The interpretation of
statutes and judicial rules is . . . a matter of free review.” State v. Herrera, 149 Idaho
216, 222 (Ct. App. 2009). As explored above, I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, and 20-222
and I.C.R. 33(f) can be reasonably interpreted so there is no conflict between them.
First, the statutes allow the district court to issue a warrant for any alleged probation
violation—willful or not. Second, the district court must have a summary hearing and
make a finding on the alleged violation. If the district court finds that the violation was
willful, it may revoke probation. If the district court finds that the violation was non-willful,
it may not revoke probation and must use alternative measures to address the violation.
This interpretation gives effect to all three statutes and I.C.R. 33(f), and it comports with
due process. In fact, permitting the district court to revoke probation for any alleged
violation, without a finding of willfulness, could run contrary to the due process clause of

but some have been concerned about revocation of probation, particularly
in the area of nonpayment of fines, without a finding that it was a willful
violation, especially since no finding of ability to pay is required before a
fine is imposed. The Committee voted in favor of recommending the rule
be amended as follows: . . . .
Criminal Rules Advisory Committee Meeting, September 16, 2011, p.6, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20121124030113/http:/www.isc.idaho.gov/orders/minutes/I
CR_CriminalMediationCommittee_09.16.11.pdf.
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the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983)
(imprisoning an indigent defendant “solely because he lacks funds to pay the fine,”
without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or examining alternatives, is
constitutionally impermissible); State v. Dabney, 159 Idaho 790, 796–97 (discussing
Bearden); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 608–09 (Ct. App. 2007) (same). Because
I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, and 20-222, and I.C.R. 33(f) can be interpreted without a
conflict, they must be interpreted as such. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974. The State’s
challenge to the “willful” requirement in I.C.R. 33(f) therefore fails.
Although Mr. Garner asserts that the statutes and the rule plainly require a willful
violation to revoke probation, Mr. Garner joins the State’s request for the Idaho
Supreme Court to retain this case. He submits that the Court’s guidance is warranted
because the existing case law has not addressed the willful requirement added to I.C.R.
33(f) in 2012. As recently as 2014, in State v. Easley, the Court acknowledged that the
district court could revoke probation even if the violation was not willful. The Court
stated:
In reviewing a probation revocation proceeding, we use a two-step
analysis. First, we ask whether the defendant violated the terms of his
probation. If it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the
terms of his probation, the second question is what should be the
consequences of that violation. . . .
The applicable legal standard the district court must utilize in
determining whether to revoke probation is based upon whether the
violation was willful or non-willful. If a knowing and intentional probation
violation has been proved, a district court’s decision to revoke probation
will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. However, if a probationer’s
violation of a probation condition was not willful, or was beyond the
probationer’s control, a court may not revoke probation and order
imprisonment without first considering alternative methods to address the
violation.
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156 Idaho 214, 222–23 (2014) (quoting State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009)).
This discussion indicates that the district court can revoke probation for a non-willful
violation as long as it first considers, and rejects, the alternatives. The Easley opinion
did not discuss the 2012 amendment to I.C.R. 33(f), however. And the case relied on by
Easley for the application legal standards for revocation, Sanchez, was decided before
the willful requirement was added to I.C.R. 33(f) in 2012. To resolve this apparent
conflict between the existing case law and I.C.R. 33(f), Mr. Garner also respectfully
requests that this Court retain this case.
Finally, for the reasons stated in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Garner maintains that
the evidence was insufficient for the district court to find he willfully violated the terms of
his probation. (Revised App. Br., pp.3–10.) Further, the district court did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards because it did not make a willfulness
finding, as required by I.C.R. 33(f). The district court never found the violations were
willful, only to be “true.” (See Tr. Vol. I,4 p.59, L.14–p.63, L.25 (district court’s ruling).) As
such, this case should be remanded for a new revocation hearing because it is unclear
the district court would have revoked Mr. Garner’s probation but-for the unsubstantiated
violations. Alternatively, this case should be remanded for a new disposition hearing for
a proper discretionary determination of willfulness under I.C.R. 33(f). See State v.
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 276 (Ct. App. 1995) (“When a discretionary ruling has been
tainted by legal or factual error,” the appellate courts “ordinarily vacate the decision and
remand the matter for a new, error-free discretionary determination by the trial court.”).

There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the
probation violation evidentiary hearing. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the
probation disposition hearing.
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Finally, Mr. Garner asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation and executing his sentence, assuming in arguendo the probation violations
were supported with sufficient evidence. (Revised App. Br., pp.11–12.)
CONCLUSION
Mr. Garner respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
amended judgment and commitment in both cases and remand the cases to the district
court for a new probation violation evidentiary hearing or disposition hearing.
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2016.

___________/s/______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of July, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
JASON ZANE GARNER
INMATE #112882
ISCC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707
CHRISTOPHER S NYE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
DAVID A CHRISTENSEN
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF

__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCS/eas

10

